What a difference a year makes

A year ago I was throwing myself into work on my M.Phil dissertation, which analyzed change in the US-Japan alliance since the end of the cold war. Those changes continued right up through the moment of submission (North Korea’s missile test was the week before the deadline).

The alliance seemed like it was bounding from strength to strength. Military cooperation, including and especially missile defense, was reaching unprecedented levels. Alliance managers reached a deal on realigning the US military presence in Okinawa and mainland Japan after years of frustration. Above all, the solid rapport between President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi ensured that the bureaucrats working on strengthening alliance cooperation had the blessings of the heads of both governments (and disputes, such as that over the Japanese ban of US beef imports, were papered over thanks in part to the crooning of Koizumi).

Those days seem long gone.

The problem is not at the military-military level, where enhanced cooperation continues unabated, but rather at the political level, where Abe has been surprisingly lackadaisical about putting in the work necessary to ensure a political foundation for deepening functional cooperation. The biggest piece of evidence often used to illustrate Abe’s lack of attentiveness is, of course, his putting trips to Beijing, Seoul, and Europe before visiting Washington to meet with President Bush. But the lack of response from Abe to comments by his foreign and defense ministers about the wisdom of certain US foreign policy decisions — regardless of the rightness of their comments — suggests that his apparent indifference to the alliance is a principled position and not the result of his poor administrative skills. In other words, as this piece spells out (although mislabeling Abe’s foreign policy stance as “neoconservatism”), Abe is something of a Gaullist nationalist actively seeking to carve out a more independent foreign policy.

It seems, however, that Abe may be getting his wish of a more independent Japan sooner than he expected, as the six-party talks have yielded a tentative agreement that is clearly not in Japan’s interest. That was always the risk with the six-party talks. As long as the US and Japan were closely linked politically, the six-party talks were an excellent vehicle for ensuring that Japan’s interests were respected and that Japan wasn’t completely friendless in the region. But the other possibility — arguably the outcome that has been achieved in Beijing — is that the US would be fed up with the situation and would reach a modus vivendi with China over Japan’s head. This has been a longtime fear of Japanese governments, but together with a US administration desperate for a victory, Abe, with his inattentiveness to the political management of the alliance, seems to have achieved that feat.

This judgement may be premature — and it’s certainly reversible (the alliance has weathered worse before). But Abe dispatching his public relations man to the US will not be enough to sort out the mess. Suddenly Cheney’s impending visit to Japan takes on considerably more significance then when it was originally scheduled; a disastrous meeting could deepen the freeze and convince Tokyo to start looking for friends elsewhere, while a productive, frank discussion could signal the beginning of a new era for the alliance marked by more prominent and independent Japanese role.

And then there’s the second Armitage Report, due to be published sometime today…

One thought on “What a difference a year makes

  1. Anonymous

    Hi, I\’ve been reading your blog for quite a while. I agree large part to what you are saying, but I don\’t think there is too much to worry about Abe\’s stance on US-Japan relations. Abe may act as though if he is indifferent. But the reality of alliances in the region hasn\’t changed at all. The bureaucrats know too well on that part, and to a degree, almost paranoid about US-Japan relations, and tend to neglect relations with others. I think now they are just trying to balance out the tip for Japan\’s own sake. And I think eventually Japan needs to become more independent whatever the circumstances are. But that doesn\’t mean a departure from a strong alliance, not at all.


Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s